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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. : 
DENNIS G. KAZDA, : Case No. 26944 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Dennis G. Kazda, appeals from a conviction of theft, 
a felony in the Third Degree. The charges were tried before the Honorable 
Jay E. Banks presiding in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict of guilty, appellant 
appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgement in his favor as a matter 
of law, or, that failing, a new trial. 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case involved trial for theft in which appellant did not take 
the witness stand in his own defense. The appellant had been found late 
at night near the scene of the theft. During closing argument the prosecutor 
reminded the jury that they were to form no opinion of guilt or innocence 
based on the fact that the accused had not taken the stand; however, he 
immediately restricted this statement by stating, !The defense has 
presented no evidence as to why the defendant was out there. What was 
he doing out there?" (R. 99) At this point defense counsel objected and moved 
for a mistrial. The motion was denied but the jury was instructed to 
disregard the statement by the prosecutor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE PROSECUTOR TO 
COMMENT UPON THE DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY 
IN HIS OWN BEHALF. 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no man shall 
be compelled to become a witness against himself. Following this admonition, 
Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. Section 3481 which states: 
"In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses 
against the United States and in all proceedings in courts martial 
and courts of inquiry in any State, District, Possession or Territory, 
the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent 
witness. His failure to make such request shall not create any 
presumption against him. " 
-2-
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In Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60 (1893), The U. S. Supreme 
Court clarified the purpose of this statute. The court reasoned that many 
totally innocent people may choose not to take the witness stand due to 
physical infirmity, emotional strain, or many other causes and therefore, 
a completely truthful witness may appear to the jury to be lying. For this 
reason, a failure to take the stand should not create any presumption of 
guilt in the mind of the jurors. As a result, the Supreme Court in Wilson 
held that, in a Federal prosecution, comment by a judge or prosecutor 
which might strengthen any presumption of guilt a juror may have would 
be reversible error. 
In Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), the United States 
Supreme Court faced the issue of comment by the prosecutor on the accused's 
failure to testify in his own behalf in a State proseuction and held that such 
comment was reversible error. In Griffin, the defendant had been convicted 
of a murder. During the trial the prosecutor and the trial court, in accor-
dance with a California statute, had commented that the accused's refusal 
to deny any of the allegations against him could be considered by the jury 
in determining the degree of credence to be given to the defendant's evidence. 
During his summation, the prosecutor had stressed this aspect emphatically. 
In overruling the California Supreme Court, the Court reasoned that any 
"comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system 
of criminal Justice' which the Fifth Amendment outlaws." Griffin at 614. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The right of a defendant not to testify in a criminal trial is a fundamental 
Constitutional right. But even so, the prosecution can make the assertion 
of this right "costly11 by turning any such claim of right into a penalty by 
drawing it to the attention of the jury. 
The Court then cited Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), which held 
that the same standards concerning the accused's silence are justified in 
either a federal or state proceeding and concluded by holding that Mthe 
Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government, and 
in its beariig on the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids 
either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions 
by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. " Griffin at 615. 
Subsequent to the Griffin case the Utah Supreme Court has not had the 
opportunity to rule on this precise issue. However, the Utah Constitution 
in Article I, Section 12, outlines a right against self-incrimination similar 
to that contained in the Fifty Amendment and the Utah Legislature has 
enumerated the privileges inherent in this right. Section 77-44-5, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, states: 
If a defendant offers himself as a witness he may be cross-
examined by the counsel for the state the same as any other 
witness. His neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any 
manner prejudice him or be used against him in the trial or 
proceeding. 
The drafters of this statute were well aware of the possible effect 
of the prosecutor's comment on the accused's refusal to take the stand. This 
is indicated in the notes following this statute. Under this subject the 
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drafters merely cited Griffin, indicating that they intended Griffin to control 
in such situations. Therefore, any such comment in Utah State proceeding 
would be reversible error. 
In cases where the accused does not take the stand, it would be 
impossible to remove all inferences the jury may make concerning such 
conduct. Accordingly, the law is very strict in admonishing jurors that 
they are to make no inference based on that fact. In this case, though, 
the prosecutor first reminded the jury of the law in this area (alerting 
them to the area to which his following statement would refer) and then 
immediately commented that the defendant had given no reasons for his 
being found in the area of the theft late at night and wondered what exactly 
he was doing there. Such comments quite easily give rise to the inference 
in the mind of any reasonable juror that the defendant had not given any 
explanation for his actions because he could not without admitting his guilt. 
For the above reasons it is apparent that the holding of the Supreme 
Court in Griffin v. California in conjunction with Section 77-44-5, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, requires the conclusion that it was reversible 
error for the prosecuting attorney to comment on the defendant's failure 
to testify in his own defense. Therefore, the trial court should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE REMARK BY THE PROSECUTOR WAS IN FACT COMMENT ON 
THE DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO TAKE THE STAND. 
The State contends that the prosecutor's remarks in closing argument 
did not constitute comment on the defendant's failure to testify but were 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
merely an observation that the testimony of the state's witnesses was 
controverted. However, it is clear that the prosecution was alluding to 
the failure of the defendant to take the witness stand. In its closing argument 
the prosecutor first reminded the jury of the law in this area -- that they 
could form no inference of guilt based on the defendant's failure to 
testify -- but then immediately qualified this statement by observing that 
the defendant had given no reasons for his being found in the area of the 
theft late at night and wondered what exactly he was doing there. Such 
comment could not be construed by any reasonable juror other than 
as comment on the defendant's failure to testify. It is also clear that the 
court realized the prejudice in this remark because it promptly instructed 
the jury to disregard it. 
As there are no Utah cases dealing directly with this issue, the 
state cites State v. Acosta, 416 P. 2d 560 (Ariz. 1966), as its leading case 
in defense of its position where similar remarks were made by the prosecutor. 
It should be noted, however, that in Acosta the state did not immediately 
preface its remarks with the statement that the jury was to make no 
inference from the failure of the defendant to testify and then add its remarks 
as a caveat to the statement. The statements noted in Acosta were used 
only as observations on the evidence presented at the trial. It should also 
be noted that in the same case the Arizona Supreme Court also stated that 
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"Any direct or indirect statements amounting to an allusion that a defendant 
failed to testify may constitute reversible error. M Acosta at 561 The court 
continued by quoting from 1 Underbill, Criminal Evidence 323. "The true 
test is was the reference calculated or intended to direct the attention of the 
jury to the defendant's neglect to avail himself of his right. M Acosta at 562 
Such was clearly the case in the matter now before this court. 
It should further be noted that the Arizona Supreme Court in a 
subsequent case saw fit to further clarify its position in this type of case. 
In State v. Fisher, 519 P. 2d 73 (Ariz. 1974), an aggravated assault case, 
it stated, "In Griffin (More explicitly analyzed below) and the cases 
following it . . . it is the inference of guilt which may be painted by the 
prosecutor in commenting on the defendant's silence which is prohibited. " 
Fisher at 76. 
The State also cites Tomaris v. State, 224 P. 2d 209 (Ariz. 1950), in 
support of its position. It need only be noted that Tomaris was decided in 
1950 and would therefore be modified by the language quoted from Acosta 
and Fisher. Also cited by the State are U. S. v. McCrae, 344 F. Supp. 
942, Cloud, v. Missouri, 507 S. W. 2d 667, and Newell v. Slayton, 468 F. 2d 
888. In McCrae and Cloud once again the prosecutor's comments were 
not prefaced with the same remarks as in the instant case and were, therefore, 
found to be merely comment upon the evidence. And in Newell the prosecutor 
had referred specifically to the lack of witnesses besides the defendant who 
could possibly present an alibi. Additionally, Newell cited Knowles v. U. S. , Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
224 F . 2d 168 (CA 10, 1955), as precedent. In Knowles it was held that 
reversible e r ro r would be committed by 'language manifestly intended or 
of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to 
be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. " Knowles at 168 
This, then, would be the standard to be followed in any Utah case by virtue 
of the fact that Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), (further discussed 
below) extended the federal standards to the states through the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Griffin at 611 There a re also many cases 
from sis ter states with similar holdings based on similar language. People 
v. Vargas, 509 P. 2d 959 (Calif. 1973), and People v. Burress, 515 P. 2d 
460 (Colo. 1973). 
From the preceeding cases it is clear that the statements in the 
prosecutor 's closing argument did constitute comment on the defendant's 
failure to testify in his own defense. 
POINT III 
SUCH ERROR WAS SO PREJUDICIAL THAT IT COULD NOT BE 
CORRECTED BY ANY SUBSEQUENT INSTRUCTIONS BY THE 
COURT TO THE JURY. 
The State contends that even if e r ro r was committed it was cured by 
the Court's instructions to the jury and that if there was any prejudice, it 
was only slight. Appellant must strenuously disagree with this position. 
In cases where the accused fails to take the stand, it would be impossible 
to remove all inferences the jury may draw regarding such conduct. It is 
only natural for the reasonable juror to wonder if the defendant is not Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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taking the stand to explain his conduct because he cannot without admitting 
his guilt. Therefore, the law is extremely clear that neither the court 
nor the prosecution can comment upon this fact. And even though such an 
inference by the jury is clearly prohibited, it is still impossible for the 
court to effectively instruct the jury to disregard the inference. Such 
instruction actually just reinforces this inference by drawing attention 
to it. Many authorities have noted this difficulty. Dean Wigmore had 
observed: 
It is well enough to contrive artificial fictions for use by 
lawyers, but to attempt to entlist the layman in process of nulli-
fying his own reasoning powers is merely futile and tends toward 
confusion and a disrespect for the law's reasonableness. 
8 Wigmore, Evidence, Section 2272 at 436 (1966). 
Noting Dean Wigmore's observations that it is highly doubtful that 
the jury can be effectively instructed to disregard the inference in the first 
place, it follows then that it is infinitely harder for them to disregard it 
after the prosecution has all but completely painted the inference for 
them. Clearly, any prejudice arising out of this situation is substantial. 
Two Tenth Circuit cases clearly indicate the substantial degree of 
prejudice arising from such comment by the prosecutor. In both cases 
the lower courts were reversed on this ground even though no objection 
had been made during trial in either case. In U.S. v. Nolan, 416 F. 2d 
588 (CA 10, 1969), comment on the failure of the defendant to deny any 
of the allegations against him was made during the prosecutor's closing 
argument. In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals states, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"We think the error committed was so plain, fundamental, and serious 
that we should consider it, although timely objection was not made thereto 
in the trial court, " Nolan at 594. In U.S. v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204 
(CA 10, 1970), the rule was extended even further applying it to cases 
where the prosecutor comments that the defendant had failed to make 
any denials of guilt to the police. Once again the Court of Appeals referred 
to such error as Mso plain, fundamental, and serious" that it could be 
reviewed even when no timely objection had been made. Arnold at 206. 
The fact that such comment is made during closing argument has also 
been relied upon in other cases as determining the seriousness of the 
prejudice. U. S. v. King, 485 F. 2d 360. And some cases have even 
extended the Griffin rule to the point that such comment is per se reversible 
error. Brill v. Salisbury, 326 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Ohio, 1971). 
In this case the prosecutor did commit reversible error by his comments 
on the failure of the defendant to testify in his own defense. And this error 
was so "plain, fundamental and serious" that no subsequent instructions by 
the court could either cure or lessen the substantial prejudice caused by 
it. Therefore, the trial court should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that: 
1. The remarkes by the prosecutor in this case were in fact 
comment on the defendant's failure to testify in his own defense; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2. It was reversible error for the prosecutor to comment upon the 
defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf; and 
3. Such error was so prejudicial that it could not be corrected 
by any subsequent instructions by the Court to the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, Kespectiully submitted, 
LARRYUIJ KELLER 
AttornejMor Appellant 
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